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Abstract
The objective of this article is to create a framework to study asymptotic equilibria in popu-
lations with immigration, and this with a special focus on human populations. We present a
new model, based on Resource Dependent Branching Processes, which is now broad enough to
cope with the goal of finding equilibrium criteria under reasonable hypotheses. Our equations
are expressed in terms of natality rates, mean productivity and mean consumption of the
home-population and the immigrant population as well as policies of the Society to distribute
resources among individuals. We also study the impact of integration of one sub-population
into the other one, and in a third model, the additional influence of an ongoing stream of new
immigrants. Proofs of the results are based on classical limit theorems, on Borel-Cantelli type
arguments, on the Theorem of envelopment of Bruss and Duerinckx (2015), on a maximum
inequality of Bruss and Robertson (1991), and on an extension of J.M. Steele (2016) of the
latter. Conditions for the existence of an equilibrium often prove to be severe, and sometimes
surprisingly sensitive. This underlines how demanding the real world of immigration can be
for politicians trying to make sound decisions. Our main objective is to provide decision help
through insights from an adequate theory. Another objective of the present study is to learn
which of the possible control measures are best for combining feasibility and efficiency to reach
an equilibrium, and to recognise the corresponding steps one has to take towards controls. We
also make preliminary suggestions to envisage ways to optimal control. As far as the author
is aware, all results are new.
Keywords: Controlled branching processes, Galton-Watson process; Standard of living, Ex-
tinction, Theorem of envelopment, Stopped sums, Bruss-Robertson-Steele inequality, Martin-
gale convergence, Fractional integration, Random environment, Optimal transport, Lorenz
curve.
AMS 2010 Math. subj. classific.: 60J85, secondary 49J21.
Short Running title: Immigration and Equilibrium
1 Motivation
During the last few years the picture of human migration rates between countries in the world has
dramatically changed. Focussing on immigration, the following can be seen. Countries with a long
history of immigration such as Australia and the United States, still have a large percentage of
immigrants but the gradient of change is becoming small compared to countries such as Austria,
Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and others. Until 2013, Germany for example, had an immigration
rate of about one per thousand per year (1/1000)/y, that is below the rates of several other
European countries, whereas in 2015 the German exploded to (25/1000)/y.
Several countries show much goodwill towards immigrants, in particular for refugees in danger
in their home countries. Goodwill alone is not sufficient to deal with problems which arise if the
number of immigrants increases quickly. The evident challenges are to offer accommodation to
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immigrants, and to find employment or create new jobs for them, but also how to give immigrants
a real chance to integrate themselves into their new country. Integration seems only possible if the
natality rates of immigrants and host population converge sufficiently quickly to each other since
otherwise children of immigrants have no surrounding in which they can naturally learn the new
home-language. Converging birth rates are thus an important issue. As we shall see, there are
other issues almost as important.
1.1 Focussing on equilibria
We will focus our interest on the existence of long-term equilibria. This is a rather theoretical focus,
but we think that, provided the models are not unrealistic, the theory we develop is rewarding
for a deeper understanding of the effect of immigration. As a consequence, our results are only
indirectly connected with questions surrounding economical and econometric shorter-term aspects
of immigration, as e.g. concerning targeted immigration policies, cost-benefit analysis, planning
of resource allocation, prediction, and others. For an authoritative presentation of shorter-term
economic aspects of immigration see e.g. Borjas (2014).
As the present paper will show, an equilibrium, in fact any kind of equilibrium, may be hard
to reach under strong immigration, and it is difficult to give political advice for viable equilibria.
This is our goal, however, and we want to make things as transparent as possible.
Understanding the conditions under which a home-population and immigrants can, in the longer
run, attain an equilibrium is a strongly motivated objective. Studies on peace suggest that there
can exist no convincing long-term alternative to equilibria. We shall try in this paper to cope with
this challenge by studying a model based on Resource-Dependent Branching Processes (RDBPs).
1.2 Related work
Branching processes with immigration have been studied by several authors, and most of these
authors study Markov processes, in particular modified Galton-Watson processes. Classical refer-
ences are the book by Haccou et al. (2005) and the many articles cited in there. See also the new
book on controlled branching processes by Gonza´les et al. (2018).
As in several other branching process models, a density-dependent development of the pop-
ulation around the so-called critical case will have a natural appeal in our model, and thus our
approach shares in part the motivation of the work of Afanasev et al. (2005), Jagers and Klebaner
(2000), Ispa´ny (2016), and others. Fluctuations under immigration (see e.g. Ispany et. al (2005)
and Wei and Winnicki (1989)) are also naturally at stake although we only speak indirectly about
fluctuations. Concerning density controls, one would also like to know when, and in what way, a
population will leave the region around criticality without control. In this respect our interests
come close to those motivating former studies of Bingham and Doney (1974), Keller et al. (1987),
Klebaner and Zeitouni (1994), and, more recently, Barbour et al. (2015), Kersting (2018), and
Bansaye et. al (2018).
We cannot directly profit from these results because resource dependent branching processes
have a different structure, and our approach must go different ways. It is the notion of society
control, which we are forced to incorporate in a realistic view of human behaviour, which explains
one part of the major difference in structure. A second one stems from allowing for independence
within each sub-population but sacrificing the independence of sub-processes as such in favour of
a common resource space on which sub-populations have to live.
When thinking about how to tailor a tractable model, indirect influences can be almost as
beneficial as a direct influence. The author sincerely acknowledges what he has learned from the
papers cited above, and from many others not mentioned here in the longer branching-process
history. All have helped to develop intuition.
2
2 Content and objective of this paper
In Section 3 we summarise the notion of RDBPs without immigration, the idea behind them,
and the reasons why we believe that these processes are an adequate approach for describing the
development of human populations. For the present paper we always understand an RDBP as
defined in Bruss and Duerinckx (2015, section 2), and the so-called society’s obligation principle
as defined in Bruss (2016, subsection 7.1.1).
In Section 4 we explain why we should not try to use directly the model of Bruss and Duerinckx
(2015) if we allow for immigration. Unlike emigration, immigration is indeed not incorporated in
their model. The conclusion is that a better model must be found and that we should study
a suitable multi-variate process. Although this seems like a natural step, it is less obvious how
to do this if we want to study the development of a society which is non-discriminating in the
sense that individuals stemming from the home-population or from the immigrant-population are
submitted to the same rules for receiving resources from a common resource space. Individuals
submit random claims to the society, and for the present paper it suffices to understand a claim as
what an individual would like to obtain for individual consumption. The society decides whether
to accept or not to accept the claim from the combined (merged) list of claims according to the
currently fixed rules conditioned on available resources. This implies that the sub-populations are
dependent on each other.
To cope with this problem we recall in Section 5 an extension of what Steele (2016) calls the
Bruss and Robertson-inequality (BR-inequality.) Steele’s extension will play a central role since it
allows to make full use of the upper bound of the Theorem of envelopment (Th. 4.13 in Bruss
and Duerinckx (2015)). This will yield in the following sections conditions for the survival of both
sub-processes.
Section 6 defines the notion of an equilibrium. Then it studies a bi-variate RDBP counting
individuals from the home-population and immigrant population without new immigrants as if
they behaved like cohabitating resource-dependent populations. This is the adequate model for
the case where from some finite time onwards there are no new immigrants and where we want to
understand how both sub-populations would develop. We derive the corresponding criterion for
possible equilibria. Here we see that in the so-to-speak typical case, i.e. immigrants are poorer
but have more children, an equilibrium cannot be reached without control.
Section 7 incorporates the feature of integration where individuals from the immigrant-population
become successively part of the home-population and then behave exactly like individuals of the
latter. The situation becomes now quite different in the sense that if the society were in com-
plete command of integration, even the unfavourable typical case may allow for an equilibrium.
Increasing the facilities of integration is indeed one of the easier controls to reach an equilibrium.
In Section 8 we complete the set of our basic models by allowing also an ongoing stream of
new immigrants. In particular we can show that our approach stays coherent under a reasonable
condition and that the computation of the limiting equilibrium follows then the same lines. The
important benefit is that the studied different influences can now directly be compared with each
other.
In Section 9 we examine aspects of the flexibility of our models. We also show why our results, so
far all obtained for the so-called weakest-first policy, are of general interest because many different
policies can be re-interpreted as such a policy under transformed claim distribution functions.
Claim distributions can be transformed by mixing different distributions and we return here to the
BR-inequality to understand and interpret its stability with respect to different kinds of mixing.
We also shortly address the possibility to modify rules of attribution of resources and to envisage
optimal control seen as a problem of optimal transport.
Section 10, finally, collects items of important criticism one may see for our approach and for
our models, and then draws the main conclusions.
3
3 Resource Dependent Branching processes
Resource Dependent Branching Processes, introduced by the author already in 1982 (see Bruss
1984a), are not very known. We will review them briefly by explaining the motivation behind
them. This is done in a summarising style with the intention to facilitate the reading of the
present paper, and to draw attention to these models. For details we refer to sections 1 and 2 of
Bruss and Duerinckx (2015).
3.1 Features
One part of the idea behind RDBPs is that a suitable model for human populations must offer
several basic features: Individuals have to eat, to reproduce, and to work, in order to be able
to survive. They consume resources, may inherit and/or save them, and then again they create
new resources for the descendants. In our definition of RDBPs we suppose that what is left after
consumption will go into a common resource space, although many other assumptions would be
compatible with the model. And then we need a notion of a society which defines the policy of
distributing resources, and also a notion of protest against decisions of the society.
Individual requests (needs) of resources are seen as random variables, called claims. We can
see in our model individual claims as individual consumption, although they are more precisely
defined as what individuals request to have at their disposal. If an individual does not receive its
claim under the current policy we suppose it shows its protest against Society by emigration before
leaving offspring, or equivalently, by not reproducing in the present population.
Unless stated otherwise a claim is either served completely, or not at all. Such a claim is then
consumed or partially consumed, and what is left goes as heritage into the common reserve for the
next generation. Heritage is also seen as resource creation for the next generation. For simplicity, all
resulting claims within the same generation are supposed to be independent identically distributed
(i.i.d.) random variables according to a continuous distribution function F.
Reproduction of human beings is in reality bi-sexual, of course. We refer to Daley (1968),
and, for an overview of such models, to Molina (2010). However, since we only study long-term
developments for large population sizes it suffices to study reproduction in terms of the average
reproduction of mating units (Bruss 1984b, p. 916). This allows us to always argue as if we had
asexual reproduction, and the mean of reproduction 1 is understood as the mean reproduction of
mating couples.
The rules to distribute available resources according to the resulting claims are defined by the
current policy of the population. For the precise definition see Def. 2.1 in Bruss and Duerinckx
(2015).
RDBPs as local models
The second part of the idea behind RDBPs is that they should serve as local models. It is not
realistic to make long-term hypotheses for the development of human populations. Local means
local in time, that is, defined on a short horizon of one or a few generations. An advantage of
local models is that they can be tailored with simple assumptions. Assuming that certain random
variables associated with individuals from a human population are i.i.d. within a given generation
is easier to defend than assuming that these i.i.d.-hypotheses would hold forever. RDBPs are used
in a history-driven set-up to form a global model. This is explained in the Introduction of Bruss
and Duerinckx (2015), and made explicit in terms of the society’s obligation principle (Bruss (2016)
subsection 1.1.1).
3.2 Concatenating RDBPs to a global model
The concatenation is as follows. At time t− we suppose to know the probabilistic prescription of
the current RDBP defined on [t, t+1[, but not the (precise) prescription of the future RDBPs. We
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suppose that the population has objectives, recalled below, and that the obligation principle forces
it to control for these objectives at each time t− with t ∈ N. This is done by two actions. First, by
examining the current parameters essential for the development (mean rates of birth, production
and consumption), and second, by encouraging certain changes of parameters and by changing the
policy of distributing resources (see below).
The global objective was defined in Bruss and Duerinckx (2015) by two natural hypotheses which
we maintain throughout the present paper: The large majority of individuals
H1: wants to survive and see a future for the descendants,
H2: prefers a higher standard of living to a lower one.
Here the hypothesis H1 is supposed to take priority if H2 becomes incompatible with H1, which is
often the case.
The follow-up is supposed to be ruled by the mentioned society obligation principle to observe
H1 and H2 which we make now precise. At each time t− the society checks the following question:
If all currently observed parameters and the policy to distribute resources were to stay the same
for all future generations - that is, if the current RDBP would run forever- would it then have
a positive probability of surviving forever? If yes, the society keeps this RDBP or, optionally,
replaces it by another RDBP fulfilling this requirement. If not, it controls immediately to obtain
as quickly as possible a new RDBP for which this answer would be yes. No minimum survival
probability is prescribed, provided that it is strictly positive.
This principle turns the development of the population into a history-driven sequence of the
local RDBPs. We know no details about the future ones, but if the society obligation principle is
always respected we know the objective, the possible range of control actions, and thus the possible
range of models respecting H1 and H2. This is why we can focus our interest on knowing under
which condition a specific RDBP can survive forever.
Note that, unlike the model of a RDBP which has a well-defined probability prescription, this
control approach to form a global model for a human society is no probability model. It contrasts
therefore other interesting branching process models involving certain forms of competition for
resources, as for instance the branching annihilating random walk studied by Perl et al (2015), or,
in the context of varying or random environments, the processes studied by Keller et al. (1987),
Kersting (2017) and recently Bansaye et al. (2018), Barczy et al. (2018), and Pap (2018). In fact,
not being a probability model, the global model seems to contrast any other existing branching
process model. Thinking of our objective and of the complexity of human populations facing
an unknown future, the global model may be more adequate, however. Also, in each generation
decisions of control are based on studying the current RDBP, that is, on a probability model, so
that the control decisions themselves are based on a rigorous setting.
3.3 RDBPs and the wf-policy
Let (Γn)n=1,2,··· be an arbitrary RDBP with mean reproduction of individuals m, average pro-
ductivity r and resource claim distribution function F (x) := FX(x). It follows from Bruss and
Duerinckx (2015) (p. 336, Prop. 4.3) that (Γn) will get extinct almost surely if it cannot pos-
sibly survive under the so-called weakest-first policy (wf-policy). This wf-policy is the policy to
distribute the resources from the available resource space with priority to those individuals with
the smallest claims as long as the current resource space allows for it. Recall that those individuals
whose claims are not completely satisfied are supposed not to reproduce in the population. Given
the random resource claims X1, X2, · · · , Xn, say from the n descendants in a given generation with
available resource space s > 0, the total number of those who will reproduce with the population
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is thus
N(n, s) := sup{1 ≤ k ≤ n :
k∑
j=1
Xj,n ≤ s}, (1)
where Xj,n is the jth smallest order statistic of the X1, X2, · · · , Xn. The random variable N(n, s)
is thus the counting variable for the wf-policy. It is easier to understand and to deal with than
counting variables of arbitrary policies, and this is one reason why it plays a major rule throughout
this paper.
The second reason is that, as shown in Section 9, the wf-policy can be adapted to quite a large
class of policies. Here already the essence of the idea: Suppose that the society decides to quit the
wf-policy by, for instance, ignoring all claims falling in certain subintervals of the positive half-line,
or else, accepting claims in some other subintervals with some higher probability. If the society
announces this change of policy at the beginning of a generation, then individuals may reconsider
their claims, and the original claim distribution function F is likely to change in the next generation
into some other distribution function F˜ . Although the shift of claims may be difficult to predict in
practice, a wf-policy with respect to F˜ is in general different from the wf-policy with respect to F,
that is, the society applies now, in terms of F , another policy.
The class of policies which, for a given F, can be presented as a wf-policy under some modified
distribution F˜ can be shown to be comfortably large because a subclass of this class, tentatively
called pure-order policies by Bruss and Duerinckx (work in progress) is large enough for most
practical purposes. Actually, for the essence of our objective in this paper the mentioned idea of
relocating claims will be sufficient. This is why we will confine our interest in the present paper
until Section 8 included to the wf-policy.
4 Subtleties in understanding immigration
The subtlety in understanding immigration is best visualised by looking first at the original (uni-
variate) RDBP introduced in Bruss and Duerinckx (2015). We recall that m denotes the offspring
mean of an individual, and r its average production of resources.
4.1 Scarce resources
Confining to the economically relevant case of scarce resources, we suppose that the average amount
of resources r left by an ancestor does not exceed the average total sum of claims submitted by
his descendants. With m denoting the reproduction mean of an individual, and F the distribution
function of individual claim sizes with mean µ, this condition translates into
r ≤ m
ˆ ∞
0
xdF (x) = mµ. (2)
As recalled before, the wf-process can only survive if mF (τ) ≥ 1, where the parameter τ :=
τ(F, r,m) is defined by
τ = inf
{
t ≥ 0 :
ˆ t
0
xdF (x) ≥ r/m.
}
(3)
If F is seen as being a fixed claim distribution, we can drop F and write
τ := τ(r,m) := τ(F, r,m). (4)
We think of claims as being evaluated in monetary units, and we assume that F is strictly increasing
and absolute continuous in some neighbourhood of this solution. Hence τ is uniquely determined
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by
E
(
X 1{X≤τ}
)
=
ˆ τ
0
xdF (x) = r/m. (5)
The product mF (τ) can be seen as the effective long-run multiplication rate of the process when
all other factors are kept invariant. The condition mF (τ) ≥ 1 reminds us of the criticality/super-
criticality condition for a Galton-Watson branching process. RDBPs are much more complicated
processes, of course, but the comparison is partially justified in as much as those individuals which
reproduce within a given generation do so independently of each other.
The integral equation (3) yielding the long-run multiplication rate mF (τ) yields more by study-
ing the gradient of change of mF (τ(m, r)) if the parameters r and m change and interact. Let
us first look at the influence of the parameter r (average resource production of an individual) for
fixed natality m. It was shown in Bruss (2016) that
∂ (mF (τ(r,m)))
∂r
≥ 0, (6)
and that this is strongly related with the extinction probability. Typically, if r goes down the
chance of survival decreases, although this may seem a priori unrelated. (This is, by the way, a
delicate observation for those countries in which the birth rate m alone is already below 1 and
which thus will get extinct anyway. Decreasing r accelerates extinction, and since decreasing the
age of retirement of individuals reduces their life-productivity, and thus reduces r, early retirement
is harmful for the probability of survival.) The influence of a change of m for fixed r and F hides
no surprise. It fits our intuition, namely, if m increases, the survival probability increases (Bruss
(2016 ), Theorem 7.7 (ii)).
Now comes the important question what will happen if r and m change at the same time? This
is what often occurs with immigration in the real world, because, in general, the poorer populations
have higher birth rates and a smaller expected productivity. Hence m goes up and r goes down.
As we have just seen above the survival probability can now increase only if the influence of the
increase of m on the crucial product mF (τ) is stronger than the negative influence caused by the
decrease of r. Since τ (see (3)) is an implicit function of m and r it is hard to see what will happen.
Moreover we can no longer speak of a long-term multiplication rate mF (τ) because, a priori, it
is not meaningful to assume that F is fixed. Hence the simplification τ(r,m) := τ(F, r,m) is no
longer justified. The point is that when a larger number of people with different cultural and
economic background joins the home-population, this will change the distribution function F of
claims.
The difficulty induced by immigration is that the mechanism of this change is not at all trans-
parent. It might seem reasonable to push our analysis through by imposing that F belongs to a
set of distribution functions in some class parametrised by m and r, F ∈ {F (m,r);m, r ∈ R+} , say.
However, it is not realistic to suppose that we understand the interaction of the three assumed
actors r,m, and a probably delayed result F (m,r), and we must attack the problem in a different
way.
It is a more recent result of J. M. Steele (2016) extending an inequality of Bruss and Robertson
(1991) which instigated the idea of how to do this in a tractable way.
5 Maximum inequality and Steele’s extension
Let X1, X2, · · · be a sequence of positive random variables with respective absolute continuous
distribution functions Fk, k = 1, 2, · · · , and let n > 0 be a fixed positive integer. Further let
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X1,n ≤ X2,n ≤ · · · ≤ Xn,n be the increasing order statistics of X1, X2, · · · , Xn, and let for s ∈ R+,
N˜(n, s) =
{
0, if X1,n > s,
sup{k ∈ N : X1,n +X2,n + · · ·+Xk,n ≤ s}, otherwise.
(7)
N˜(n, s) is thus essentially the same as N(n, s) defined before in (1), namely the maximum number
of variables in {X1, X2, · · · , Xn} we can sum up without exceeding s, the only difference being
that the n order statistics X1,n ≤ X2,n ≤ · · · ≤ Xn,n are not necessarily the order statistics of
identically distributed random variables. In the following we reserve the notation N(s, n) for the
case of identically distributed random variables.
We note that both N(n, s) and N˜(n, s) are quasi-stopping times in the (more precise) sense
that N(n, s)+1 and N˜(n, s)+1 are stopping times on the sequence of the corresponding increasing
order statistics. Although we will not directly use this fact, it is helpful for the intuition for the
following results.
Theorem 5.1 (Bruss and Robertson (1991))
E(N(n, s)) ≤ nF (τ), (8)
where τ := τ(n, s) solves
n
ˆ τ
0
xdF (x) = s. (9)
If, moreover, the Xk’s are independent and (sn)→∞ with lim sn/n > 0 then
n−1N(n, sn)/F (τ(n, sn)) → 1 a.s., as n→∞. (10)
For the proof of the inequality (8) with (9) see Lemma 4.1 of Bruss and Robertson (1991), page
622; for the proof of (10) see Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 of the same paper.
It is the inequality (8) with (9) which attracts here our main interest. Steele (2016) called this
inequality the Bruss-Robertson inequality (BR-inequality). His extension of (8) and (9) displays a
more versatile inequality.
Theorem 5.2 (J. M. Steele (2016)) Let X1, X2, · · · , Xn be such that each Xk has a absolute
continuous distribution function Fk, and let N˜(n, s) be defined as in (7). Then
E(N˜(n, s)) ≤
n∑
k=1
Fk(τ), (11)
where τ := τ(n, s) is a solution of
n∑
k=1
ˆ τ
0
xdFk(x) = s. (12)
For the proof see section 3 in Steele (2016).
Hence Steele (2016) drops the assumption that the Xk are identically distributed; each Xk can
now have its own continuous distribution Fk, and the corresponding result remains true. Bruss
and Robertson (1991) were motivated by problems in which the result (10) played the main role,
and where it was natural to suppose the Xk’s to be i.i.d. random variables. Although seeing that
independence was not used in their proof of (8) and (9) in Theorem 5.1 they did not point this
out. Interestingly, Steele’s proof is a skilfully adapted version of the proof of Bruss and Robertson.
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Moreover, as we will see in Section 9, in some cases there is some benefit in re-interpreting Steele’s
extension as the BR-inequality, or vice-versa, for mixed distributions.
It is Steele’s great merit (Steele (2016)) to have underlined the true interest of this result
without the assumption of identically distributed Xk’s, and that it is not the joint distribution
of variables which counts but only their marginals. Steele’s extension was an eye-opener for the
author and instigated the author’s approach presented in this paper. It intervenes repeatedly in
the important proofs.
We should also mention here that Steele (2016) gives examples of applications strongly related
with the work of Samuels and Steele (1981), Arlotto et. al (2015), and Bruss and Delbaen (2001)
in the domain of monotone subsequence problems, but also examples hinting to quite different
problems, as e.g. in combinatorial problems. Again differently motivated, they are of independent
interest, and many readers may find them very stimulating.
6 New RDBP-model
We are now ready to study cohabitation of sub-populations, and also immigration.
The idea is to use Steele’s extension (Theorem 5.2) for different classes of parameters and
different claim distribution functions. By different classes we mean essentially two, namely those
associated with the home-population, Ch, say, respectively the immigrant-population, Ci, say. In
Section 8 we will also refer to an additional class of new immigrants Cni. In all notations used in the
present paper the indices h, i, and ni are mnemonic for home-population, immigrant-population,
and new immigrants, respectively.
We first define the basic RDBP with immigration in terms of two sub-populations living under
a common constraint of resources.
Definition 6.1: Let (Γ(t))t=0,1,2,··· := (Γht ,Γ
i
t)t=0,1,2,··· be a bivariate counting process with values
in N2 defined on a filtered probability space (Ω,S, (St)t∈N, P ), where
(i) Γh0 = h0,Γ
i
0 = i0, with h0, i0 ∈ {1, 2, · · · },
(ii) (Γht )t=0,1,··· is a RDBP with mean reproduction (mean number of descendants) mh,
a mean resource space contribution rh, an individual claim size distribution Fh. The
corresponding mean claim is denoted by µh =
´∞
0
xdFh(x),
(iii) (Γit)t=0,1,··· is a RDBP with corresponding parameters mi, ri corresponding claim
size distribution function Fi, and mean claim µi =
´∞
0
xdFi(x),
(iv) (Γht ) and (Γ
i
t) are supposed to be submitted to the same policy of resource distri-
bution from the common resource space built up by the sum of all individual resource
contributions provided by the bi-variate process (Γ(t))t=0,1,2,···.
Here it is understood that, whenever we speak of a RDBP, all assumptions of Bruss and
Duerinckx (2015) are supposed to be satisfied. We also recall that, in order to assure almost-
sure convergence of sample means in the rows of the arrays of the involved random variables, we
sometimes needed complete convergence (see e.g. Asmussen and Kurtz (1980)), and this is why we
suppose that all second moments of the random variables exist. As in most branching processes
of interest, we suppose that the probability of an individual having no offspring is strictly positive
for both sub-populations. We maintain these hypotheses throughout this paper.
Note that, in using RDBPs to model the sub-processes (Γht ) and (Γ
i
t), reproduction and resource
space contributions of individuals are i.i.d, random variables within each sub-process separately.
This is intrinsic in the definition of an RDBP. The processes (Γht ) and (Γ
i
t) are however, without
further assumptions, not independent of each other, because of (iv). In analogy to the case of scarce
resources for one population, (see (2)), we will assume, in all what follows, that the expected total
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production of resources of all sub-populations together is less than the expected sum of all their
claims together.
Also, since we have so far no ongoing flow of new immigrants joining the home-population, and
no integration of one sub-population into the other one, we see the model defined by (i)-(iv) as a
model of cohabitation. We refer to it as Model I.
6.1 Equilibria for Model I
Consider in Model I a fixed generation t > 0 and the transition from state (Γht ,Γ
i
t) to state
(Γht+1,Γ
i
t+1), t = 1, 2, · · · . Let Dht (u) (respectively, Rht (u)) be the random number of offspring
(respectively, random total resource contribution) of u individuals of the home-population in gen-
eration t, and let Dit(u) and R
i
t(u) be defined correspondingly for the immigrant population.
Given Γht and Γ
i
t the total resource space created by the two together equals, according to (iv),
R˜(Γht ,Γ
i
t) := R
h
t (Γ
h
t ) +R
i
t(Γ
i
t).
For the wf-policy applied to the joined population we have from Steele’s extension (see (12))
the corresponding random equation
Dht (Γ
h
t )
ˆ τt
0
xdFh(x) +D
i
t(Γ
i
t)
ˆ τt
0
xdFi(x) = R˜(Γ
h
t ,Γ
i
t), (13)
where τt is also a random variable, namely according to τ(n, s) defined in Theorem 5.2,
τt := τt
(
Dht (Γ
h
t ) +D
i
t(Γ
i
t), R
h
t (Γ
h
t ) +R
i
t(Γ
i
t)
)
.
Note that both random equations are well-defined for all t = 1, 2, · · · and all ω ∈ Ω with the
distribution functions of random claims Fh and Fi, as before, not depending on ω ∈ Ω. We now
define first the notion of an equilibrium.
Definition 6.2 We say that the bivariate process (Γ(t))t=1,2,··· tends to an equilibrium, if there
exists a random variable α defined on (Ω,S, (St)t∈N, P ), with 0 < α <∞ such that
P
(
lim
t→∞
Γit
Γht
= α
∣∣∣Γit 6→ 0,Γht 6→ 0) = 1. (14)
Remark 6.2: We thus understand an equilibrium as a non-trivial equilibrium between the two sub-
populations, that is we do not include α = 0 or α−1 = 0 in the definition. We will see in Subsection
6.5.2 that the set of possible values of α (seen as ”candidates values” for an equilibrium) is typically
very small, and in realistic situations often consisting of at most one point.
6.2 Conditions for an asymptotic equilibrium without new immigrants
Recall the Envelopment Theorem (see p. 314, Th. 4.14, Bruss and Duerinckx 2015). Its last
statement says that if a given RDBP dies out with probability one under the wf-policy (written
as qW = 1) then any other RDBP with the same parameters and claim distribution would die out
with probability one (qΓ = 1 for all Γ). RDBP’s with the same parameters and claim distribution
can only differ in their policies. Hence, in other words, no change of policy whatsoever can enable
a process to survive with a positive probability, if the corresponding wf-process dies out with
probability one. Since survival is necessary for the existence of a (nontrivial) equilibrium, this is
a central result in what follows. Moreover, as said before, studying our process (Γt) under this
specific wf-policy is less restrictive than it may look.
Before stating the first main result, a remark on notation. The existence of the random variable
α in Definition 6.2 necessitates of course the existence of candidate values α1, α2, · · · . For easy of
notation we use, whenever this leads to no ambiguity, the notation α for a (fixed) candidate value.
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Theorem 6.1
(a) Let S be the union of the supports of the claim size distributions Fh and Fi. If the natality
means mh and mi as well as the productivity means rh and ri stay invariant over all generations,
then an equilibrium can only exist in Model I if there exists a value 0 < α <∞ and a corresponding
value τ := τ(α) ∈ S satisfying the equation
mh
ˆ τ
0
xdFh(x) + αmi
ˆ τ
0
xdFi(x) = rh + αri. (15)
subject to the constraints
mh Fh(τ) = mi Fi(τ) ≥ 1. (16)
(b) Moreover, conditioned on the event that {Γit/Γht 6→ 0}∩{Γit/Γht 6→ ∞} replacing the constraints
(16) by mh Fh(τ) = mi Fi(τ) > 1 implies that (a) becomes also a sufficient condition for the
existence of an equilibrium.
Proof: The proof consists of four parts, the first three (i)-(iii) proving (a), and (iv) proving (b).
(i) We will first show that if a limiting equilibrium exists then necessarily both sub-processes tend
to infinity as t→∞, that is,
lim
t→∞
(
Γit/Γ
h
t
)
exists =⇒ P (Γit →∞)|Γit 6→ 0) = P (Γht →∞|Γht 6→ 0) = 1. (17)
The proof of part (i) is by contradiction.
Suppose that the statement (17) is wrong. We first note that both processes (Γit) and (Γ
i
t)
must stay bounded away from zero as t → ∞, since, by definition, zero is an absorbing state for
both processes because there are no new immigrants after time 0. Since α must satisfy 0 < α <∞,
no sub-population may disappear. But then, if (17) is false, this means that there exist bounds
bh > 0 and bi > 0, say, such that
P (Γit ≤ bi i.o.|Γit > 0) > 0 and/or P(Γht ≤ bh i.o.|Γht > 0) > 0,
where i.o. stands for infinitely often. Put b = max{bi, bh} and p0 = min{pi0, ph0}, where ph0 > 0,
respectively pi0 > 0, denotes the probability, that a randomly chosen individual in the home-
population, respectively immigrant-population, has no offspring. Since reproduction of individuals
is mutually independent within each sub-population, we must have∑
t
P (Γht+1 = 0|Γht > 0) =∞ or
∑
t
P (Γit+1 = 0|Γit > 0) =∞
because in both sums all terms are non-negative, and, in at least one sum, infinitely many terms
are greater than or equal pb0 > 0. This implies (see e.g. Corollary 1 of Bruss (1980)) that at least
one sub-process will get extinct almost surely. This is in contradiction to (14), however, and hence,
conditioned on survival of both sub-processes,
Γit →∞ a.s. and Γht →∞ a.s. , as t→∞,
as stated in (17).
(ii) We now prove that, for a given 0 < α < ∞ satisfying (14), there must exist a value τ = τ(α)
such that equation (15) is satisfied.
First note that if such a value τ exists for a given value α, then τ is unique if the densities
dFh(t)/dt and dFi(t)/dt do not vanish at the same time in a neighbourhood of τ because both
11
integrands on the l.h.s. of equation (15) are non-negative. If we denote S the union of the supports
of Fh and Fi we can define more generally
τ := inf
{
t ∈ S : mh
ˆ t
0
xdFh(x) + αmi
ˆ t
0
xdFi(x) = rh + αri
}
.
This implies the uniqueness of τ in any case, and justifies the notation τ := τ(α).
We now turn to equation (13) with R˜(Γht ,Γ
i
t) = R
h
t (Γ
h
t ) +R
i
t(Γ
i
t).
Since reproduction and resource production of individuals are independent variables within
each sub-process, and since Fh and Fi are fixed distribution functions, we can apply the strong
law of large numbers in equation (13) for both processes separately. Moreover, we will see at the
same time that τt converges to a constant τ := τ(α) almost surely.
Indeed, by dividing both sides of (13) by Γht , and using the dummy multiplication factor Γ
i
t/Γ
i
t
for the second terms on both sides, this equation becomes
Dht (Γ
h
t )
Γht
ˆ τt
0
xdFh(x) +
Dit(Γ
i
t)
Γit
Γit
Γht
ˆ τt
0
xdFi(x) =
Rht (Γ
h
t )
Γht
+
Rit(Γ
i
t)
Γit
Γit
Γht
. (18)
Accordingly, conditioned on survival of both sub-processes (Γht ) and (Γ
i
t), the term multiplying
the first integral on the l.h.s. converges almost surely to mh whereas the first term on the r.h.s.
almost surely to rh. Moreover, if the limit α in (14) exists then, as t→∞,
Dit(Γ
i
t)
Γit
Γit
Γht
→ αmi a.s. and R
i
t(Γ
i
t)
Γit
Γit
Γht
→ α ri a.s.
Hence, conditioned on survival of both sub-populations and on the existence of the limit α, the
r.h.s. of (18) has the limit rh +αri a.s. as t→∞. This implies that the corresponding l.h.s. must
also have a limit. Since the upper bound is the same τt in both integrals of equation (18), and
both integrals have non-negative integrands, we conclude that τt must converge almost surely to a
constant τ , as t → ∞ . Taking these two arguments together we conclude that, if an equilibrium
exists, then the corresponding α and τ must satisfy the limiting analogue of (18), namely
mh
ˆ τ
0
xdFh(x) + αmi
ˆ τ
0
xdFi(x) = rh + αri.
This is equation (16) as claimed in the Theorem. Moreover, with our definition of τ for a given α,
the τ := τ(α) must be unique. This proves part (ii).
(iii) In order to see why the combined constraint qualifications (16) must hold for τ = τ(α), we
first prove the equality part of it (which, at first, may look surprising). Let the random variable
αt be defined by αt = Γ
i
t/Γ
h
t , or equivalently
1
1 + αt
=
Γht
Γht + Γ
i
t
, t = 1, 2 · · · . (19)
Conditioned on survival of both sub-processes we know thus from part (i) that αt → α for some α
and, as seen in part (ii), τt → τ := τ(α) a.s. as t→∞.
Further, in order to be an element of the home-population at time t+ 1, it is necessary for an
individual to be a descendant of it, and sufficient if its resource claim does not exceed the threshold
τt. It follows that, conditioned on survival of (Γ
h
t ) and (Γ
i
t), the random fraction of individuals
belonging to the home-population one generation later can therefore be written as
1
1 + αt+1
=
Dht (Γ
h
t )Fh(τt)
Dht (Γ
h
t )Fh(τt) +D
i
t(Γ
i
t)Fi(τt)
, (20)
12
where τt → τ a.s. as t→∞.
Now divide on the r.h.s. of this equation the numerator and denominator by Γht . Using part
(i) of the proof and the existence of the limit α we see then that, conditioned on survival of both
sub-proceeses,
Dit(Γ
i
t)/D
h
t (Γ
h
t )→ miα/mh a.s. as t→∞.
Taking the limit on both sides of (20) for t→∞ yields then after straightforward computations
1
1 + α
=
1
1 + α (miFi(τ)/mhFh(τ))
, (21)
and hence miFi(τ) = mhFh(τ). This proves the equality part of the constraint qualification (15).
To complete the proof of part (iii) it remains to show that the conditions mhFh(τ) ≥ 1 and
mhFh(τ) ≥ 1 are necessary for the existence of an equilibrium.
We argue again by contradiction.
Suppose the contrary, and suppose first that 0 ≤ mhFh(τ) < 1. Let b ∈ ]mhFh(τ), 1[. Since we
can confine our interest on the case Γht →∞ almost surely as t→∞, and since Dht (Γht ) is the sum
of Γht i.i.d. random variables, we see straightforwardly from the strong law of large numbers and
b < 1 that, for all Γht sufficiently large,
E
(
Γht+1
∣∣Γht > 0) = E (Dht (Γht )Fh(τt)∣∣Γht > 0) < E (bΓht ∣∣Γht > 0) < E (Γht ∣∣Γht > 0) .
This implies that the process (Γht ) stays bounded in conditional expectation (conditioned on non-
extinction) so that ∑
t
(pho )
E(Γht+1|Γt>0) =∞,
where we recall that pho denotes the probability that an individual in the home-population has
no children. But then, by another Borel-Cantelli type argument related with the one we gave
before (see now e.g. Bruss (1978), pp 54-56, Theorem 1) we get the contradiction (Γht )→ 0 a.s. as
t → ∞. A contradiction is obtained in an analogous way by supposing that an equilibrium exists
and miFi(τ) < 1.
This completes the proof of part (iii).
(iv) We finally have to show that, given that {Γit/Γht 6→ 0} ∩ {Γit/Γht 6→ ∞}, then, replacing the
condition (16) by the slightly stronger condition
mh Fh(τ) = mi Fi(τ) > 1
is sufficient for an α-equilibrium to exist with a strictly positive probability.
As we know that the equality mh Fh(τ) = mi Fi(τ) is necessary for the existence of an equilib-
rium, as we have shown already in the first part of the proof of part (iii), we only have to show to
shown that
P
(
{Γht →∞} ∩ {Γit →∞}
∣∣∣mhFh(τ) = miFi(τ) > 1) > 0,
because, given the joint event {Γht →∞} ∩ {Γit →∞}, we can follow the arguments from (18) up
to (21) to establish the limiting equation (15).
Now, if at least one of the two sub-processes tends to infinity with strictly positive probability,
then both must do so according to the definition of α (0 < α < ∞) as the a.s. limiting ratio of
Γit/Γ
h
t as t→∞. Hence, recalling (17) of part (i), it suffices to show that
P
(
Γht →∞
∣∣∣mhFh(τ) > 1) = 1− P(Γht → 0∣∣∣mhFh(τ) > 1) > 0.
Since, by Definition 6.1, the process (Γht ) is a RDBP this follows however already from Theorem
4.4 ii) b) of Bruss and Duerinckx (2015).
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This completes the proof of Theorem 6.1.
6.2 Remarks
1. Note that in (i) we neither need nor prove that the value α is unique but only that there
is a one-to-one correspondence between τ and α, if such a candidate value α exists. Indeed, in
Subsection 6.5.2 we will give examples with several candidates α for an equilibrium.
2. In the proof of part (i) and at the end of part (iii) we did not use the Markov property of (Γht ) and
(Γit) although this would have shortened the proof. Indeed, we do have the Markov property from
the assumption that both processes are RDBPs (see Prop. 4.1 of Bruss and Duerinckx (2015)).
However, we only used that nh (ni) individuals in the home-(immigrant)-population will have no
descendants with probability at least pnh0 (p
ni
0 ). The statement (17) holds more generally and may
leave room for introducing more general processes but this direction is not pursued in the present
paper.
6.3 The role of τ as a threshold claim
It is the value τ which may be seen as an approximate upper threshold claim for any individual
in the combined process Γ(t), provided the effectives of the sub-populations are not too small.
Individuals claiming less than τ will have a good chance to remain in the society and to reproduce
whereas those claiming more than τ will not. In any finite state at time t the true threshold will be
the value τt := τ(ω) solving, for the same ω equation (13). The true value τt depends of course on
the empirical distribution function of the merged list of claims submitted by both sub-populations.
In the following Lemma we give a strong bound on the speed of convergence of τt → τ.
Lemma 6.1 If the constraints (15) are satisfied with mhFh(τ) = mhFh(τ) > 1 (strict inequality),
then, conditioned on survival of both sub-processes, the threshold values τt, t = 1, 2, · · · , defined
in (18) converge exponentially quickly to their limit τ figuring in equation (15).
Proof. The Dvoretzky–Kiefer–Wolfowitz inequality implies that the empirical distribution func-
tion Fn for n i.i.d random variables following the distribution function F satisfies
P (sup
x∈R
|Fn(x)− F (x)| > δ) ≤ 2e−2nδ2
for all δ > 0. For F := Fh, say, this implies in particular
∀δ > 0 : P
(∣∣Fh,Dht (Γht )(x)− Fh(x)∣∣ > δ∣∣∣Dht (Γht )) ≤ 2e−2Dht (Γht )δ2 a.s.,
not depending on x, and the corresponding inequality holds if we replace Fh, D
h
t , and Γ
h
t by Fi, D
i
t
and Γit respectively. Now, the distance between adjacent claims on the merged list of increasing
order statistics of the claims at time t cannot be larger than the distance between adjacent claims
in any of the separate lists. Thus, if we denote the true and the empirical distribution function of
the merged list of claims at time t by Jt(·) and J˜t(·), respectively, we obtain
∀x > 0,∀δ > 0 : P
(∣∣J˜t(x)− Jt(x)∣∣ > δ∣∣∣Γht ,Γit) ≤ 2e−2(Dht (Γht )∨Dit(Γit))δ2 a.s.
independently of x, where a ∨ b denotes the maximum of a and b.
Now, with both long-term multipliers mhFh(τ) and mhFh(τ) being strictly greater than one,
conditioned on survival of both processes (Γht ) and (Γ
i
t), the random variables Γ
h
t and Γ
h
t will
tend exponentially quickly to infinity as t tends to infinity. The same must then hold for the
respective numbers of descendants Dht (Γ
h
t ) and D
i(Γit). It follows from the preceding inequality
that the functions J˜t(x) and Jt(x) converge, as t→∞, exponentially quickly to each other for all
x. Since Jt is a convex mixture of the two absolute continuous functions Fh and Fi, Jt is itself
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absolutely continuous. Thus Jt is also uniformly continuous on any compact interval containing
τ = limt→∞ τt as an interior point. Consequently, for any  > 0 there exists a constant L > 0 not
depending on x such that
∀ > 0 : |J˜t(τt)− Jt(τ)| <  =⇒ |τt − τ | < L.
Hence the exponential speed of convergence of J˜t(τt) → Jt(τ) a.s. carries over to the speed of
convergence of (τt)→ τ a.s., and Lemma 6.1 is proved.
6.4 Interplay of natality, productivity and resource claims
One possible solution τ of equation (16) can directly be read off, namely if the same τ solves
simultaneously the two equations
mh
ˆ τ
0
xdFh(x) = rh; mi
ˆ τ
0
xdFi(x) = ri. (22)
This solution may be seen as a case of perfect self-sufficiency of the two cohabitating sub-populations
under the wf-policy of attributing resources. Indeed, (22) says in words that an individual produces
in expectation exactly what its expected number of children with accepted claims will consume in
expectation.
However, this coincidence can hardly be hoped for in reality. For instance, if Fh = Fi then we
have to assume rh/mh = ri/mi. Immigration goes mostly from the poorer nation into the direction
of the richer one so that, as richness is positively correlated with productivity, we typically have
ri < rh. Moreover, since natality rates are usually higher in poorer countries the case mi > mh is
again more typical. Thus the ratio rh/mh is usually larger, and often substantially larger, than the
ratio ri/mi. We conclude that for Model I the existence of an equilibrium is an exception rather
than the rule.
The illustrations in Figure 1 and Figure 2 display in a simplified form the typical
phenomenon in the case of beta-densities of the variables claims.
Figure 1: Two beta-densities fh and fi on [0, 1] exemplifying in simplified form the distribution of
claims from individuals of the home-population and immigrants: fh(x) with parameters (a, b) =
(4, 2.5) (in bold), and fi(x) with parameters (a, b) = (4, 6).
The graphs of mh Fh and mi Fi with mh < mi do not intersect on [0, 1], and hence
the constraints (15) cannot be satisfied. This exemplifies the situation of immigrants
having higher birth rates and lower productivity and thus lower claims than individuals
in the home-population. Possible control actions to allow for an intersection above the
level 1 would be to try to increase mh (upper curve)
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Figure 2: This graph shows, for mh = 1.8 and mi = 2.5, the functions mh Fh and (mh + 1)Fh
(both in bold), as well as mi Fi (in grey).
Control actions of the type of increasing the natality of one sub-population or reducing the natality
of the other one, as indicated in Figure 2, are mathematically easy to understand, but they are
arguably difficult to accomplish in practice because, often enough, family size standards are strongly
anchored in the culture or tradition of sub-populations.
6.4.1 Self-sufficiency
It is customary to refer to a population as being self-sufficient if, with respect to natality, produc-
tivity, and consumption, it would be able to live on its own. Let us make this more precise by
requiring that, if all parameters stayed the same forever, it would survive on its own forever with
positive probability. What then would self-sufficiency mean for our model (Model I), where both
sub-populations live in co-habitation profiting from a common resource space? Can they converge
to an equilibrium?
To answer this question we look again at Theorem 6.1. Equation (16) shows that if the mean
production rh of the home-population and ri for the immigrants are kept constant, then the l.h.s.
is increasing in τ for any pair of distribution functions Fh and Fi. Then, as we have seen, for each
α there can exist at most one τ := τ(α), and vice versa. Solving equation (16) for α yields
α = α(τ) =
rh −mh
´ τ
0
xdFh(x)
mi
´ τ
0
xdFi(x)− ri
, (23)
where α should satisfy 0 < α < ∞. Equation (23) has a non-trivial practical aspect worth being
stated in words, with a trivial proof. Let us recall for this the notion of perfect self-sufficiency we
introduced at the beginning of subsection 6.4 for the case that a single value τ solves simultaneous
both equations in (22). Then we have
Corollary 6.1: Unless in the case of perfect self-sufficiency an equilibrium can only exist if one
sub-population becomes a net contributor to the Society’s resource space, and the other one a net
consumer of it.
Proof: By definition of an equilibrium we must have α ∈ ]0,∞[, and hence the numerator and
denominator in (23) must have the same sign. Hence, if the sign is well-defined (meaning different
from 0 in most countries), the statement is true. If both numerator and denominator vanish in
equation (23), this implies that the same τ solves simultaneously both equations in (22). .
Remark 6.3 As far as one can judge from the media, Corollary 6.1, as trivial as it is, seemingly
contradicts the intuition of contemporary decision makers. The wide-spread feeling is that if
sub-populations are ”doing sufficiently well” in the sense that they could each live on their own,
everything will be fine for a peaceful cohabitation. This is not true on the level of a long-term
equilibrium. Without further control, the latter can only be attained for perfectly self-sufficient
sub-populations in the sense of (22). Otherwise, without control, one sub-population will take
over. The point is that there is little reason to believe that an adequate control would establish
itself.
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6.4.2 Lorenz curves
Self-sufficiency of a population does not only depend on its total resources but, to some extent,
also on the distribution of resources among the population. For instance, if the poorest class of
individuals owns a relatively even smaller part of the total wealth it may be inclined to leave and,
to close the gap, have to be replaced by more expensive individuals.
The distribution of wealth is usually presented in a Lorenz curve. Accepted claims of individuals
in our model can be seen as increments in the Lorenz curve, and Jacquemain (2017) showed that
certain results of Bruss and Duerinckx (2015) allow indeed for a clear re-interpretations in these
terms. Economists may be interested in finding a link between (23) and the two Lorenz curves for
the sub-populations. Although the mean family sizes mh and mi intervene also in (23), this link
remains worth studying. We should also mention that Wajnberg (2014) interprets those results
more freely, but some of these interpretations seem harder to justify.
6.5 Multiple possible equilibria
So far we have seen that, if an α-equilibrium exists, then the solution τ := τ(α) solving equation
(15) is unique. When we introduced α in Definition 6.2 we introduced it as a random variable,
implying that we may have several candidates for an equilibrium. When will this be the case?
We first look at a simple model for comparison.
6.5.1 Comparing Model I with two Galton-Watson processes in co-habitation
Consider two Galton-Watson processes (Z
(1)
t )t=1,1,··· and (Z
(2)
t )t=1,2,··· with respective reproduction
means m1 and m2. We assume the usual conditions p
(j)
0 > 0, p
(j)
0 + p
(j)
1 < 1 for j = 1, 2. Recall
also that we supposed for all random variables in this paper the existence of second moments, so
that in particular the inequalities E(Z
(j)
1 logZ
(j)
1 |Z(j)0 = 1) <∞ hold for j = 1, 2. It is well known
that in this case the processes (Y
(1)
t ) and (Y
(1)
t ) defined by
Y
(1)
t = Z
(1)
t /m
t
1, Y
(2)
t = Z
(2)
t /m
t
2, t = 1, 2, · · ·
are a.s.-converging martingales so that Y
(1)
t /Y
(2)
t converges a.s. to a random variable. If m1 6= m2
then clearly only a degenerate limit 0 or ∞ can exist for (Z(1)t /Z(2)t )t=1,2,···. If m1 = m2 however,
then the process (Y
(1)
t /Y
(2)
t ) coincides with (Z
(1)
t /Z
(2)
t ) and thus converges a.s. to an equilibrium in
the sense of our Definition 6.2 where this limit is distributed like the ratio of two functions of normal
distributions (see e.g. Hall and Heyde (1980), subsection 1.3). Now, once both sub-populations
(Z
(1)
t ) and (Z
(2)
t ) are sufficiently large, it follows from the i.i.d. reproduction of individuals that
Z
(1)
t+k
Z
(2)
t+k
∼ Z
(1)
t m
k
1
Z
(2)
t m
k
1
=
Z
(1)
t
Z
(2)
t
, as k →∞ (24)
and from the strong law of large numbers that the conditional distribution of Z
(1)
t+k/Z
(2)
t+k, k =
1, 2, ... given Z
(1)
t and Z
(2)
t concentrates around Z
(1)
t /Z
(2)
t . In simplified language we may say that
the earlier history of states of the two Galton-Watson processes points quickly to some sufficiently
small neighbourhood of the equilibrium αZ = limt→∞ Z
(1)
t /Z
(2)
t for which there are uncountably
many candidates.
6.5.2 Example of multiple candidates for equilibria
Returning to Model I we see the similiarity with the long-term reproduction rates mhFh(τ) and
miFi(τ) which have to coincide in order to allow for an equilibrium. At the same time we also
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see that RDBPs are much more restrictive on possible equilibria because we now need a value τ
satisfying mhFh(τ) = miFi(τ) ≥ 1, and, at the same time for a candidate α, the corresponding
solution of equation (15). In the interesting case where Fi and Fh do not coincide on an interval
of positive Lebesgue measure, where not both are equal to zero or one at the same time, it is clear
that, in contrast to the model of two independent GWPs, there cannot exist intervals of possible
equilibria but at most countably many candidates.
Now, intuitively, we should be able to find several candidates if we choose Fh and Fi as well
as mh and mi sufficiently close to each other with several intersection points of mhFh = miFi on
the set of t such that mhFh(t) ≥ 1 and then choose parameters rh and ri to keep this compatible
with equation (15). Indeed, following this intuition leads easily to an example showing multiple
possible equilibria in Model I. Here is one:
Let mh = 3 and mi = 2.8, and let for n ∈ {1, 2, · · · },
F
(n)
h (t) = t+ (2npi)
−1sin(2npit); F (n)i (t) = t− (2npi)−1sin(2npit).
For n = 4, for example, we obtain for rh = 1 and ri = 0.5 three candidates which (using Mathemat-
ica, rounded to four decimals) are the points (τ1 = 0.6031, α(τ1) = 13.3675), (τ2 = 0.7795, α(τ2) =
0.3681), and (τ3 = 0.8424, α(τ3) = 0.0016). Similarly as in our argument shown through (24) we
would see, as soon as we can observe the processes (Γht ) and (Γ
i
t), which of these equilibrium
candidates is relevant. Note how different these values can be.
6.5.3 Importance in practice
The preceding example is artificial in the sense that Fh and Fi mimic each other with one being a
very similar delayed version of the other one. For larger n we may find more (isolated) candidates.
However, even if such examples made sense in a real-world problem, this would hardly lead to a
confusion because the two sub-populations would be typically in the thousands or millions. With
the proven exponential speed of convergence (see Sub-section 6.3), the current states will determine
with probability close to one the relevant τ, and thus the relevant equilibrium. Moreover, it is hard
to imagine realistic situations where mhFh and miFi allow for several points of intersection. The
phenomenon of multiple equilibrium is of mathematical interest rather than relevant in practice,
and the typical real world problem coming with immigration is to find an accessible equilibrium
rather than having several candidates.
6.5.4 Open problem, and its impact.
The reader will have noticed that Theorem 6.1 would be a necessary and sufficient criterion for an
equilibrium to exist with strictly positive except that we have not shown that the slightly stricter
constraints mhFh(τ) > 1 and miFi(τ) > 1 are also necessary. Is it thinkable that mhFh(τt) and
miFi(τt) converge, as t→∞, so slowly to 1 that both sub-processes may still tend to infinity and
thus enable the existence of an equilibrium? In the case of limiting criticality the τt seem difficult
to control, and the author must leave this question open.
Independently of this, it is the necessary conditions which should attract our main interest
for applications since it is the necessary steps for survival which must be taken (ad-hoc) by the
decision makers in each generation. What would it mean to say that ”if the current conditions of
the RDBPs would stay forever, then such or such condition would also be sufficient for the existence
of an equilibrium”? The necessary conditions must be observed by the society obligation principle,
and unpredictable events leave little motivation to study sufficient conditions for survival in a
long-term probability model which one cannot predict, not even approximately. The mathematical
side of the open question is a challenge (also encountered in Bruss and Duerinckx (2015)), but
concerning applications, the author sees no impact.
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7 The effect of integration of immigrants
As we can see from Theorem 6.1, the constraint qualification mh Fh(τ) = mi Fi(τ) ≥ 1 is de-
manding, and is likely to be a major obstacle for the existence of a real-world equilibrium. As
argued before, immigration goes usually (apart from politically persecuted individuals) from poorer
countries with higher birth rates, i.e. mi > mh, into a richer one with stochastically larger claims.
What can be hoped for from integration, that is, immigrants adapt sufficiently quickly the eco-
nomically relevant behaviour of the home-population? By economically relevant we refer to having
the same parameters of mean natality mh and mean productivity rh, and the same distribution
function Fh of claims, whereas cultural or religious factors are not taken into consideration. Dif-
ferent assumptions about the mechanisms of integration lead then to different models. We study
a model built on, what we call, fractional integration.
7.1 Fractional Integration - Model II
Suppose that in each generation t, the fraction ϕ of the number of those individuals currently seen
as belonging to the immigrant-population, will integrate into the home-population in the sense that,
once integrated, they share the same reproduction parameter mh, the same mean productivity rh,
and the same claim distribution function Fh. The corresponding bivariate process will be denoted
by (
Γ(ϕ)(t)
)
t=1,2,···
=
(
Γ
h,(ϕ),
t ,Γ
i,(ϕ)
t
)
t=1,2,···
. (25)
We note that, from a formal point of view, we should append the fraction ϕ as an additional index
in (Γt), (Γ
h
t ) and (Γ
i
t), because these are now also functions of ϕ.
Definition 7.1: The bi-variate process
(
Γ(ϕ)(t)
)
t=1,2,···consisting of the home-population and
the immigrant-population when, in each generation t a fraction ϕ of the immigrant-population
integrates into the home-population will be called ϕ-fractional integrated process. We refer to the
process
(
Γ(ϕ)(t)
)
t=1,2,··· with constant integration fraction ϕ as Model II.
In the spirit of Definition 6.1 we define:
Definition 7.2 We say that the bivariate process (Γ(ϕ)(t))t=1,2,··· tends to an equilibrium if there
exist a value ϕ ∈ [0, 1[ and a corresponding random variable 0 < αϕ <∞ such that
P
(
lim
t→∞
Γ
i, (ϕ)
t
Γ
h, (ϕ)
t
= αϕ
∣∣∣Γi,(ϕ)t 6→ 0,Γh,(ϕ)t 6→ 0
)
= 1. (26)
As we shall see in the following Subsection it leads in general to no ambiguity to think of ϕ as being
fixed and, for simplicity of notation, to drop the upper index (ϕ) in the sub-processes whenever
αϕ and ϕ are implicit functions of each other with a unique solution, and this will always be the
case if the limit αϕ exists. In particular, α0 = α, Γ
i, (0)
t = Γ
i
t and Γ
h, (0)
t = Γ
h
t . To save space in
the longer equations to come, we define
Φh(t) =
ˆ t
0
xdFh(x); Φi(t) =
ˆ t
0
xdFi(x).
Our objective is now to derive the corresponding equilibrium conditions.
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7.2 Equilibrium equations for the combined process with fractional in-
tegration
The random total resource space at time t + 1 becomes then in the simplified notation described
above
R˜
(
Γht + ϕΓ
i
t, (1− ϕ)Γit)
)
= Rh(Γht + ϕΓ
i
t) +R
i((1− ϕ)Γit). (27)
If ϕΓit is integer-valued, then R
h(Γht + ϕΓ
i
t) is well-defined and follows the same distribution as
Rh(Γht ) + R
h(ϕΓit). To exclude ambiguity we think of ϕΓ
i
t as being defined as [ϕΓ
i
t], where [x]
denotes the floor of x, say. This is asymptotically of no importance if αϕ exists, of course, and will
therefore no longer be mentioned.
Lemma 7.1 The random BRS-equation for the ϕ-integration process equilibrium is given by(
Dht (Γ
h
t ) +D
h
t (ϕΓ
i
t)
)
Φh(τt) +
(
Dit(Γ
i
t)−Dit(ϕΓit)
)
Φi(τt) (28)
= Rh
(
Γht
)
+Rh
(
ϕΓit
)
+Ri
(
(1− ϕ)Γit
)
, t = 1, 2, · · · (29)
and there can exist at most one solution τt.
Proof: We have first to show that the equation defined by (28)=(29) is the random BRS-equation
for Model II. We see that it is well-defined since it is well-defined for all ω ∈ Ω and all ϕ ∈ [0, 1].
To understand the terms in (28) and (29), recall that there is a shift of the fraction ϕ of the
immigrant-population into the home-population from generation t to t + 1. By our assumption
these individuals now reproduce and consume (claim) independently like the other individuals
of the home-population, where Φh(τt) is the corresponding average accepted claim. This yields
the first product in (28), which corresponds to the total amount of accepted claims of resources
submitted by the current home-population.
The second product in (28) reflects the corresponding reduction of the number of individuals,
and thus of their total claim for the immigrant-population.
The r.h.s. of the equation, that is (29), gives accordingly the balance of the random total
resource space contributions. Here we have used throughout the additivity of resource production,
the i.i.d. reproduction within the same sub-population, and the definition of ϕ-integration. Hence,
according to equation (12), this is the random BRS-equation of Model II.
To see that for given ϕ, αϕ there exists at most one solution τt, recall that Fh(x) and Fi(x) are
absolute continuous functions so that Φh(x) and Φi(x) are also absolute continuous. Moreover,
these four functions are strictly increasing in x, so that we can repeat the arguments given in
part (ii) of the proof of Theorem 6.1. Therefore, for fixed natality and production laws governing
Dht , D
i
t, R
h
t and R
i
t, there exists at most one solution τt, depending on, and well defined, for each
ω ∈ Ω.
Theorem 7.1 For an equilibrium in Model II with integration rate ϕ to exist it is necessary that
there exists values τ > 0 and αϕ with 0 < αϕ <∞ satisfying the equation
mh
(
1 + ϕαϕ
)
Φh(τ) +miαϕ
(
1− ϕ
)
Φi(τ) = rh + riαϕ + ϕαϕ
(
rh − ri
)
(30)
subject to the constraints
mh(1 + αϕϕ)Fh(τ) = mi(1− ϕ)Fi(τ) ≥ 1. (31)
Proof: The proof is based on the facts that we can again apply the strong law of large numbers
within each sub-population, and on the hypothesis that the limit αϕ = limt→∞ Γ
i,(ϕ)
t /Γ
h,(ϕ)
t exists.
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The proof is therefore similar in its structure as the proof of Theorem 6.1., and we can be more
concise.
We show for example the limiting result on the r.h.s. of the equation, that is (29). Dividing
both sides of the equation in Lemma 7.1 by Γht := Γ
h,(ϕ)
t we can rewrite the r.h.s. of the new
equation in the form
Rh(Γht )
Γht
+
Rh(ϕΓit)
ϕΓit
ϕΓit
Γht
+
Ri((1− ϕ)Γit)
(1− ϕ)Γit
(1− ϕ)Γit
Γht
,
which, according to our assumption of independence within each sub-population, converges a.s. to
rh + rhϕαϕ + ri(1− ϕ)αϕ, as t tends to infinity. The latter is the r.h.s. of (30).
Since the r.h.s. allows for a limit conditioned on survival, the limit on the l.h.s. must also exist
and, of course, coincide. Hence in particular, under the same condition of survival, we must have
τt → τ for some τ. It is straightforward to check that the l.h.s. of (28) divided by Γtt yields then
the l.h.s. of the limiting equation (30).
The proof of the constraint qualifications in (31) is also quite similar. Let us show this for the
home-population.
Recall that the probability of an individual in the home-population having no offspring equals
ph0 > 0. Consequently, given Γ
h,(ϕ)
t = n, the absorbing state 0 is accessible within the home-
population with at least probability (ph0 )
n > 0. As we have seen by the Borel-Cantelli Lemma type
argument given in the proof of part (iii) of Theorem 6.1, the sequence of conditional expectations(
E(Γ
h,(ϕ)
t+1 |Γh,(ϕ)t > 0)
)
t=1,2,···
must therefore not stay bounded because otherwise (Γ
h,(ϕ)
t )→ 0 almost surely as t→∞. It follows
that the number of descendents in generation t+ 1 on the home-population must tend to infinity
as t tends to infinity and thus behave asymptotically like
mh
(
Γ
h,(ϕ)
t + ϕΓ
i,(ϕ)
t
)
, t = 1, 2, · · · .
Since the probability of a claim of an individual in the home-population to be accepted equals
Fh(τt) their total number in generation t+ 1 behaves like
Γht+1 ∼ mh
(
Γ
h,(ϕ)
t + ϕΓ
i,(ϕ)
t
)
Fh(τt), t = 1, 2, · · · .
The arguments for the immigrant-population follow the same line of reasoning, except that the
immigrant-population looses the fraction ϕ of its current effectives to the home-population. Its
number of descendants in generation t+ 1 behaves thus asymptotically like mi
(
Γ
i,(ϕ)
t − ϕΓi,(ϕ)t
)
,
so that
Γit+1 ∼ mi
(
Γ
i,(ϕ)
t − ϕΓi,(ϕ)t
)
Fi(τt), t = 1, 2, · · ·
Hence the necessary conditions for the existence of an equilibrium seen in (15) hold for the ϕ-
integrated process correspondingly in the form
mh(1 + αϕϕ)Fh(τ) ≥ 1 and mi(1− ϕ)Fi(τ) ≥ 1. (32)
(We note here a slight asymmetry in the sence that αϕ does not appear in the second inequality
in (32)). Finally, going then through the steps (19) to (21) in an analogous way with the new
factors shows that both factors, mh(1 +αϕϕ)Fh(τ) and mi(1−ϕ)Fi(τ), which are the asymptotic
multiplication factors for the home-population, respectively, for the immigrant-population, must
again coincide in order to allow for an αϕ-equilibrium.
This will complete the proof.
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Remark 7.1 If we replace both inequalities in (31) by ”> 1” then, conditioned on the event
{Γi,(ϕ)t /Γh,(ϕ)t 6→ 0} ∩ {Γi,(ϕ)t /Γh,(ϕ)t 6→ ∞}, Theorem 7.1 states a sufficient condition for an equi-
librium to exist with positive probability. Using the new asymptotic multiplying factors, the proof
follows exactly the same lines as (iv) of the proof of Theorem 6.1.
Illustration of an equilibrium in Model 2
Equation (30) in Theorem 7.1 is linear both in ϕ and in α. The choice of solving this equation for
ϕ or α will primarily depend on our main objective: Is our question, first of all, which equilibria
are, in principle, feasible with a certain upper bound for ϕ, or alternatively, is the relevant question
rather what integration fraction ϕ would be needed to obtain an equilibrium at a given desired
level α?
Suppose we decide for the latter, that is, we solve (30) for α. This yields
α := α(ϕ, τ) =
rh −mh Φh(τ)
ϕmhΦh(τ) + (1− ϕ)miΦi(τ)− ri + ϕ(ri − rh) (33)
This equation describes thus a surface over Sτ ×Sϕ, where Sτ and Sϕ denote the domains of τ
and ϕ, respectively. The graph of α(ϕ, τ) tends to plus or minus infinity along the curve described
by all those points (ϕ, τ) in which the denominator of α(ϕ, τ) vanishes. It seems therefore easier
and sufficiently informative to look only at the graph representing the constraints specified in (31).
If we fix α, say, we obtain then three surfaces of the form Z = Z(ϕ, τ), of which one is the
plane Z1 ≡ 1 neither depending on ϕ nor on τ, and the others being Z2(ϕ, τ) = mh(1 + αϕ)Fh(τ)
and Z3(ϕ, τ) = mi(1− ϕ)Fi(τ).
We now look at Figure 3 based on our examples of beta-distributions Fh and Fi presented in
Figure 2. In Figure 3, α is fixed. We have chosen α = 1/2. Note that the corresponding surface
α(ϕ, τ) cannot be plotted in a meaningful way in the same graph because the constraints surfaces
depend on α. The intersection of Z2 and Z3 visible above Z1, i.e. the path going up from the
plane to the upper left side, is thus the image of the points satisfying the constraints given in (31).
The projection of this path on Sτ × Sϕ =]0, 1[2 intersected with the projection of the level-curve
α = 1/2 (both not visible here) present then the set of (ϕ, τ) allowing for an α-equilibrium.
For ϕ = 0.20 for example, numerical computation (Mathematica) shows that τ = 0.80106....
7.2.1 Conclusions for Model II
The introduction of integration makes a clear and important difference compared with Model I
without integration. The constraint qualifications (30) are, at least in principle, much easier to
satisfy than those for Model I we saw in (15). Hence, if the home-population can afford the
investments needed for a more generous integration rate ϕ it will frequently succeed to obtain an
equilibrium. Given that the mean reproduction mh is, in real world, essentially smaller that mi and
that it is not easy, to overcome traditional and cultural differences explaining larger differences of
parameters (also with respect to rh and ri) we see that integration is an efficient factor of control.
Having said this we understand of course that, in the real-world setting, a larger integration rate
ϕ may change many characteristics of the home-population.
We also mention that the sensitivity of equilibrium points observed in Model I (see Sub-section
6.5) with respect to the parameters and/or claim distributions can also be observed in Model II
with respect to the additional integration parameter ϕ. This is hardly a surprise because fractional
integration can be interpreted as a change of the effective reproduction of the two sub-populations.
22
Figure 3: Illustration of Constraints for α = 1/2 and 0 < ϕ < 1, 0 < τ < 1.
In this graph we show for α = 1/2 the constraints as a function of ϕ and τ for Fh
and Fi presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The other parameters are mh = 1.8,mi =
2.5, rh = 1.0, ri = 0.6. The graph shows the plane z ≡ 1 (in blue) and the two surfaces
corresponding to the two constraints. For a better view, the graph has been rotated to
the view-point (0, 1, 1).
8 General equilibrium equations
Studying the effect of immigration in a realistic way means however more. We must assess, at
the same time, the effect of different parameters and different consumption features of two sub-
populations, the effect of integration of one sub-population into the other one, and, in addition
and in particular, the effect of an ongoing stream of new arrivals into one sub-population.
To reach this goal we should complete the model by allowing, in one form or another, new
immigrants in each generation.
Formally, we now define a tri-variate process(
Γ(ϕ,I)(t)
)
t=1,2,···
=
(
Γ
h,(ϕ,I)
t ,Γ
i,(ϕ,I)
t , It
)
t=1,2,···
(34)
where It ≥ 0 denotes the number of new immigrants in generation t. If (It) ≡ 0 and ϕ, as before,
the fraction of members of the immigrant-population which integrates into the home-population,
then the process
(
Γ(ϕ,I)(t)
)
is defined as the bi-variate process defined in (25).
To be consistent in our notation we denote the mean reproduction and the mean resource
productivity per new immigrant by mni, respectively rni. The claim distribution function for new
immigrants is denoted by Fni(x), and, correspondingly, we put
Φni(x) :=
ˆ t
0
xdFni(x).
The interaction of (It) with the two sub-processes can be modelled in many ways, and each
model may have its own justification. It would, for instance, be easy to consider new immigrants
directly as an integral part of the immigrant population with the same parameters mni = mi
and rni = ri, and the same distribution function of claims Fni(x) = Fi(x). Indeed, in this
case only the effectives in the second component would change, i.e. Γit would become Γ˜
(ϕ),i
t :=
Γ
(ϕ),i
t + It. However, this would in general not be a convincing setting because new immigrants
arriving somewhen in ]t, t+ 1[ cannot be expected to contribute to the resource space as much as
those born at time t. This is why we should allow for more freedom in the model.
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8.1 Modelling aspects
As we shall see in the following, the approach we have proposed is flexible. Even keeping all factors
different will cause no problem for our approach as long as either It/Γ
h
t or It/Γ
i
t, conditioned on
survival of both processes (Γht ) and (Γ
i
t), can be supposed to tend almost surely to some limit. We
call this in brief ni-limit condition.
The hypothesis of the existence of such a ni-limit may be restrictive unless the limit zero is
permitted, and, indeed, this is what we do permit! The condition becomes then rather mild. Also,
and in particular, it is a reasonable condition because at least one of the sub-populations will
typically decide how many new immigrants will be allowed to enter. Clearly, we do not have to
specify which one, because, if an equilibrium exists then, if one ni-limit exists, both will exist.
The advantage of our approach is that to each model corresponds then a unique tractable BRS-
equation, a unique BRS-inequality, and under the ni-limit condition a unique necessary condition
for the existence of an equilibrium. All steps leading to the equilibrium equation will essentially
follow the main scheme. The reader may agree that this unified structure allowing to pass from the
simplest model (Model I) to a model with integration (Model II), and then up to the comprehensive
model allowing in each generation new immigrants (which we will call Model III) is transparent
and adds to the tractability of the approach.
8.2 Fundamental equilibrium equation
Having said that we can think of many different models of how new immigrants should be assessed,
the author thinks that, as a first approximation, the following model appeals reasonably well to
reality. We name it here a fundamental model since it is our first model to include all essential
processes concerned by immigration into a new environment.
Of course, we are fully aware that some modifications of what we propose as Model III, might
attract more interest. Given the set-up of our approach, several modifications would be equally
tractable.
Fundamental model (Model III):
(i) In generation t, that is somewhere in [t, t+1[, It new immigrants join the co-habiting
home-population and immigrant population. We suppose that the It may depend on
Γht and/or Γ
h
t and that the process (It) satisfies the ni-limit condition where a ni-limit
0 a.s. is permitted.
(ii) New immigrants are allowed to be different from immigrants of the second or a
later generation, and also different from individuals belonging to the home-population.
In generation t, the It new immigrants have the right to consume (and do so according
to the law Fni) but their production of new resources may be practically 0 or even
negative. The same is supposed to hold for their descendants in the residual time
before time t+ 1. (This simplification seems justified since the residual time is likely to
contain more individuals who consume than produce.)
(iii) Immigrants present already for one generation or longer are still different from
individuals in the home-population up to a random time until complete integration
when they will become an integral part of the home-population. Descendants of It−1
are supposed to become members of the immigrant population but to still have their
new immigrants consumption and production behaviour.
(iv) Descendants of the generation t− 2 and earlier have either disappeared, or are in
Ci or else already integrated into Ch.
In conclusion, we allow for each of the three classes of individuals Ch, Ci and Cni with (in gen-
eral) different parameters of natality, productivity and different claim distributions. The ni-limit
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denoted by `ni is supposed to be a value determined by directives given by the home-population
and/or the (established) immigrant population, and defined by
P ( lim
t→∞(It/Γ
h
t ) = `ni|Γht →∞) = 1.
The process of integration is thought of as being fractional with parameter ϕ introduced in Section
7.1. We note that fractional integration leads in our setting to a geometric distribution of the ran-
dom time of integration after immigration. As before, no intermediate steps of partial integration
are considered.
The following Definition Theorem will give the corresponding fundamental equilibrium equation.
Definition 8.1 The tri-variate process (Γ(t)(ϕ,I))t=1,2,··· defined in (34) is said to converge to an
equilibrium, if there exists a value ϕ ∈ [0, 1] and a corresponding random variable α := αϕ, such
that conditioned on the survival of both sub-processes (Γht ) and (Γ
i
t)
lim
t→∞
Γ
i, (ϕ,I)
t
Γ
h, (ϕ,I)
t
= αϕ a.s. (35)
In the preceding definition of an equilibrium between home-population and immigrant population
it is formally not yet necessary to refer to the ni-limit condition and to the value `ni of the ni-
limit. However, the latter will automatically intervene in the following criterion which displays the
necessary equilibrium conditions. To increase the transparency of the limiting BRS-equation, we
present it in scalar product notation of vectors.
Theorem 8.1 Let ~Φ(t) denote the line vector function (Φh(t),Φi(t),Φni(t)) and ~R denote the line
vector (rh, ri, rni). A necessary condition for the existence of an α-equilibrium in the tri-variate
process (Γ(t)(ϕ,I)t=1,2,··· with ni-limit `ni is the existence of values 0 < ϕ < 1, and τ > 0 solving
the equation
~Φ(τ) ·
 mh(1 + ϕα)mi {(1− ϕ)α+Gni(τ)}}
`ni
 = ~R ·
 1 + ϕα(1− ϕ)α
Gni(τ)
 (36)
where
Gni(t) := Fni(t)mni`ni (Fh(t)mh(1 + ϕα))
−1
,
and where Fh, F i, Fni and the parameters mi,mh,mni, `ni satisfy for α, ϕ and τ the constraints
Fh(τ)mh
(
1 + ϕα
)
= Fi(τ)
{
mi(1− ϕ) +Gni(τ)
}
≥ 1. (37)
Proof: To avoid repetitions of mathematical arguments, we shall confine our proof to those parts
which are different from the proof of Theorem 7.1.
We first show that the random BRS-equation corresponding to (12) of Theorem 5.2 becomes
now for t = 1, 2, · · ·
Dht (Γ
h
t + ϕΓ
i
t) Φh(τt) +
[
Dit
(
(1− ϕ) Γit
)
+ Fni(τt)D
ni
t (It−1)
]
Φi(τt) + ItΦni(τt) (38)
= Rht
(
Γht + ϕΓ
i
t
)
+Rit
(
(1− ϕ)Γit
)
+Rnit
(
Fni(τt)D
ni
t−1(It−1)
)
. (39)
To see this we first note that the first product on the l.h.s. of this equation in line (38) does not
change compared with the first product in (28). The reason is that there are no direct transitions
from the It new immigrants (belonging to the class Cni ) into the home population, that is, no
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direct transitions from the class Cni into the class Ch. The total random consumption is thus
Dht (Γ
h
t + ϕΓ
i
t) Φh(τt), and the limiting reproduction rate within Ch becomes correspondingly
lim
t→∞
Γht+1
Γht
= mhFh(τ)(1 + ϕα). (40)
Now, the descendants of the It−1 new immigrants of the preceding generation become part of
Ci. According to the assumptions (i)-(iv) of Model III, the random number ϕΓ
i
t will again integrate
into the home-population before re-producing and thus affect the first term. Looking at the second
term in (38) we see threfore an important change for the immigrant-population (Γit)t=1,2,···. The
random number of descendants of the remaining fraction (1 − ϕ) stays, as before, in Ci. Now,
however, the (random) fraction Fi(τt) of the descendants of It−1 will submit claims in generation t
and thus also be part of Ci, thus counting for Γ
i
t+1. Multiplying the sum in brackets [ ] in (38) with
the random average consumption Φi(τt) constitutes the second term and represents the random
total consumption within the class Ci.
The consumption of the new It follows, individually, the law Fni so that the total random
consumption of the new immigrants equals ItΦni(τt), which is the third term in (38).
Line (39) follows now correspondingly, except that we had supposed in Model III that there is
no direct contribution of resources by the It new immigrants arriving in [t, t+ 1[.
It remains to prove that the constraint qualifications in (37) are necessary for the existence of
an equilibrium.
We first note that the new immigrants It intervene in the transition from (Γ
h
t ,Γ
i
t) to (Γ
h
t+1,Γ
i
t+1)
only on the side of consumption of resources but that the descendants of new immigrants from
generation t − 1 do intervene for (Γit) because they will also submit their claims in generation t.
The fraction Fni(τt) of these will add to the immigrant population. Further, the fraction Fi(τt) of
their descendants will stay in the population. Hence, dividing the effectives in the class Ci at time
t+ 1 by the corresponding number in generation t we obtain
Γit+1
Γit
=
1
Γit
(
Dit
(
(1− ϕ)Γit
)
+Dnit−1(It−1)Fni(τt−1)
)
Fi(τt) (41)
To obtain the limiting reproduction rate in Ci we now use
a) The limiting equilibrium αϕ,ni is supposed to exist. Consequently the sequence τt
converges to some value τ, and by continuity all functions Fh(τt), Fi(τt), Fni(τt) and
Φh(τt),Φi(τt),Φni(τt) converge to their corresponding limits.
b) The existence of `ni = limt→∞(It/Γht ) > 0 implies the existence of the limit
limt→∞(It−1/Γit) since, putting α = αϕ,ni we have
It−1
Γit−1
Γit−1
Γit
∼ It−1
αΓht−1
Γit−1
Γit
∼ `ni
α
Γht−1
Γht
∼ `ni
α
(mhFh(τ)(1 + ϕα))
−1
,
where the last step holds since the limiting multiplying factor in the class Ch was
already seen in (40) to be mhFh(τ)(1 + ϕα).
Using a) and b), and again the strong law of large numbers, it is straightforward to show that the
limiting multiplier of (41) becomes
lim
t→∞
Γit+1
Γit
= Fi(τ)
(
mi(1− ϕ) + Fni(τ)mni`ni
Fh(τ)mh(1 + ϕα)
)
, (42)
which proves the constraint qualification.
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Note also that in our recursive setting, the number It−2 or the numbers of new immigrants from
earlier generations have already been taken into consideration into the numbers Γit−1,Γ
i
t−2 · · · and
do not show up any longer.
To understand the additional term Gni(t) figuring in the equation (36) let us compute the
limiting influence of the stream of new immigrants (It)t=1,2,··· on both sub-populations. If we
know it for one sub-population we then know it for the other one if we suppose that the limit αϕ,ni
defined in (35) exists. Keeping the delay of one generation for this influence in mind we divide
It−1 by Γht , (say) and obtain under the condition `ni = limt→∞ It/Γ
h
t ,
It−1
Γht
=
(
It−1
Γht−1
)(
Γht−1
Γht
)
∼ `ni lim
t→∞
Γht−1
Fh(τt)Dht−1
(
Γht−1 + ϕΓ
i
t−1
) (43)
= `ni
1
Fh(τ)mh(1 + ϕα)
, (44)
Similarly, as in the proofs of Theorem 6.1 and Theorem 7.1, we can see that the limiting reproduc-
tion rate must be the same in both sub-populations in order to allow for an equilibrium, and our
Borel-Cantelli type arguments apply again directly to see that that it must be greater or equal to
one, completing the proof of Theorem 8.1.
Remark 8.1 If `ni = 0, then it is intuitive that (It)t=1,2,··· has no asymptotic influence on the
existence and form of an equilibrium, and this is confirmed by comparing (35) and (36) with (30)
and (31). Note however that the influence of (It) can be substantial on the development over time
of effectives within the sub-populations. Furthermore, for any question of control needed to follow
the society’s obligation principle, the society has to look at each time t at (36) and (37) so that all
parameters governing (It) as well as the integral Φni(τt) keep their relevance.
Sections 6, 7 and 8 constitute the main results of the present paper. The objective of the
following Section is twofold. We want, on the one hand, advertise our approach in order to attract
attention, and we do this by suggesting modifications of our model into different directions and
showing that our approach stays compatible for several of them. On the other hand we would also
like to briefly discuss how Society could envisage using claim distribution functions to effectively
change the policy.
9 The flexibility of the approach
9.1 Modifications of our models
9.1.1 Modifying the attribution of ressources
Our models inherit from the definition of a RDBP the rule that individual claims are either served
completely, or else, not at all, and that individuals with refused claims do not reproduce. One
may object that this zero-one rule of satisfying claims is not fully realistic because individuals may
accept compromises. It is relatively easy to modify our models into this direction without changing
the essence our approach to find the new equilibrium criteria.
Suppose that, as before, individuals of the sub-population Cδ, δ ∈ {h, i, ni} submit claims
according to distribution Fδ and follow the law of reproduction {pδ`}`=0,1,2,···, but Society follows
the following scheme: It decides to fix threshold values
0 =: s0 < s1 < s2 < · · · < sk < sk+1 :=∞,
say, and to partition offspring means in k different classes:
Modification : An individual j in class Cδ submitting the claim Xj governed by the claim dis-
tribution Fδ will see its claim listed as the maximum threshold below its claim, that is X˜j =
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∑k
l=1 sl1{Xj ∈ [sl, sl+1[}. Note that the applied policy does not depend on δ. If the claim X˜j is
accepted we now suppose that the individual will reproduce within Cδ with the conditional mean
E
(
Dδ(su)
∣∣∣Xj ∈ [su, su+1[) =: muδ , δ ∈ {h, i, ni}, u ∈ {0, 1, · · · k}
being constant for each claim sub-interval. The idea is that the spacings can be chosen so that the
desired effect is obtained, and that the probability of an individual being willing to reproduce can
be built in these reproduction means.
For example, by choosing increasing gaps sj+1− sj , the typical loss compared with the original
claim will on the average increase with increasing claims, and a decreasing offspring mean over
the claim intervals would reduce the willingness of an individual to stay and reproduce. But this
can be expressed differently by modelling it in terms of an increasing probability pδ0 of having no
children, or again by a decresing mean reproduction. Choosing other spacings between the sj ’s
would have different effects.
Now let us look at the effect on our results.
It suffices to look at Model I. The random BRS-equation (13) as well as equation (15) only
change in the sense that
(i) the integrands of the integrals will change into sjdFh(x), respectively sjdFi(x) for x ∈
[sj , sj+1[ but Fh and Fi stay unchanged.
(ii) the integrals now each split into a sum over the partition with different reproduction means
which are constant over the sub-intervals of claims.
Consequently, despite the truncation of the claims, the corresponding l.h.s. of (15) stays increasing
and absolute continuous with respect to τ. The approach to find the equilibrium equation is thus
the same.
9.1.2 Modifying integration.
There is also freedom for the definition of integration. If we suppose that that in generation t the
rate of integration is ϕt with 0 < ϕt < 1 then (27) and the random BRS-equation(28) = (29) keep
their form with ϕ being replaced by ϕt. Thus, it suffices to only assume that (ϕt)t=1,2,... converges
to a limit ϕ to maintain Theorem 7.1 as is. Of course, the resulting limiting equilibrium αϕ may
be quite different from αϕ for constant ϕ. The ”earlier history” evoked in 6.5.1 may have itself
quite an erratic behavior if the sequence (ϕt) converges slowly.
Subsection 9.1 presents just two examples showing that the models can be generalised without
jeopardising the essence of our approach, and it is not hard to find other reasonable modifications
for which our approach stays tractable.
9.2 Changing from the wf-policy to more general policies
So far we have always argued in terms of the counting random variable N(n, s), respectively
N˜(n, s), which, as we recall here, is the relevant counting function for the weakest-first society
(wf-society) (see Bruss and Duerinckx (2015), subsection 3.2.) The main reason is that according
to Proposition 4.3 of this paper no society can survive unless the wf-society can survive.
The Theorem of envelopment states that the envelope of any development of a RDBP is formed
by the wf-society and the strongest first-society (sf-society.) The latter has also a counting function
based on order statistics, namely counting the decreasing order statistics of claims one can sum up
without exceeding the available resource space. The lower bound given by the sf-society is not as
neat as the upper bound, but it plays an equally important role because we know, again from the
proof of the theorem of envelopment, that there can be no better one.
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The second reason is that the counting function N(n, s), respectively N˜(n, s), are in many ways
the easiest to deal with. The idea to confine policies to order statistics of claims is, as announced
before, less restrictive than it seems, and we shall now extend on this fact.
9.3 Order statistics based policies and extensions
Let us confine our interest for the moment to a single RDBP with claim distribution F. Trivially,
no finite sum depends on the ordering of its terms, so that any finite sum equals the sum of
the increasing or decreasing order statistics of its terms. The same must hold for stopped sums
provided that the quasi-stopping time defines the same selection of sum terms. The latter can
often be obtained by adding additional rules leading to a de-facto change of the claim distribution
function F .
We explain this by shortly discussing an example.
Suppose Society may want to favour middle-size claims at the expense of the lower range and/or
upper range of claims. Society has many possibilities to achieve this. For instance it can announce
that, from the next generation onwards, claims exceeding a certain value u (and only in this case),
say will be submitted to a lottery L with two possible outcomes L ∈ {0, 1}. If L = 0 then claim
X will be reduced to cu for some fixed 0 < c ≤ 1 and listed on the list of claims as cu. If L = 1
then it will be listed as u+ (X −u)/g(X) where g(·) is some fixed strictly increasing function with
g(·) ≥ 1 everywhere. Let X˜ be the random outcome by submitting a claim X. Hence
X˜ := 1{X≤u}X + 1{X>u}
(
1{L=0}cu+ 1{L=1} {u+ (X − u)/g(X)}
)
.
With the decision, whether or not, to claim more than u left to each individual, and P (L = 0) =
a = 1− P (L = 1) each individual may look at the conditional expectation
E(X˜|X) = 1{X≤u}X + 1{X>u}
(
acu+ (1− a){u+ (X − u)/g(X)}). (45)
There is nothing special about this new rule, the only fact we want to indicate here is to show how
far one can already go with such a change of policy. The constants u, c, a as well as the function
g are chosen by the society which has thus an infinity of possibilities to push tendencies for claim
sizes, in the desired direction. E(X˜|X) in (44) shows a way to do this for individuals who are
supposed to rational with respect to expectation. Clearly, there are many other ways to influence
tendencies.
The actual outcome of such interventions is not always easy to predict because one would have
to know how those individuals, who would like to stay in the process, would relocate the claims
they originally intended to submit. However, we know that if F˜ is the resulting new distribution
of claims then the wf-policy for F˜ corresponds to a different policy for F, and to exemplify this
was here are only modest objective.
The same reasoning holds of course for the claim-distributions Fh, Fi, and Fni. Since any policy
is supposed to be applied equally to all individuals, independently of to which sub-population they
belong, this implies new constraints. If we want to change Fh into F˜h, and this change is formalised
by an operator T , say, applied to Fh, we have the constraint
F˜h := T ◦ Fh =⇒ F˜i := T ◦ Fi and F˜ni := T ◦ Fni (46)
for the same operator T . It remains to propose tools we may use to construct such an operator T
satisfying (46).
9.4 Tools for controlling claim distributions
Although Society must apply the same policy to all individuals, it can nevertheless use all infor-
mation it has about the socio-economic structure of different layers of the sub-populations, such
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as e.g. unskilled workers, skilled workers, high-school levels, ... or different layers defined by a
partition according to sex and age-classes, etc. If F is the overall claim distribution function then
Society sees F as a mixture of distribution functions Fj , j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , `} where ` denotes the
number of layers, and Fj the distribution function of claims stemming from layer number j.
When Society considers how individuals in a sub-population, or within a certain layer of a
sub-population may react to announcements of control such as tax policies, policies to encourage
consumptions, and others, then it sees a different kind of mixing. Any individual may change its
claim behaviour by passing, independently of other individuals, with probability gj , say, to a claim
distribution Gj . With additional information, Society may also consider a model assuming that an
individual belonging to layer i would change with probability g
(i)
j , to a claim distribution G
(i)
j .
We see that there is a large number of possibilities to control claim distributions by different
ways of mixing and we will not enter into questions of statistical nature which may naturally arise
in practice. However, to keep the theory rigorous we now show that all our necessary conditions for
equilibrium stay rigorous, even if our ”reference” distribution functions Fh, Fi, Fni are permanently
re-constituted over the generations by different kinds of mixing distributions.
9.5 BR-inequality, Steele’s extension, and mixing distribution functions.
We are here naturally interested in two kinds of mixing: On the one hand classical (independent)
mixing where each random variable follows, with a given probability gj a distribution function Fj ,
independently of the other random variables. On the other hand we have what one may call, in
our context, sub-class mixing where an individual submits a Fj-distributed claim if and only if it
belongs to some sub-class of the joint population sharing the same characteristics
Lemma 9 Let k, n ∈ N with 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and let G be the mixed distribution function defined by
G(t) =
∑k
j=1 ajFj(t), where all Fj ’s are absolute continuous distribution functions, and where all
aj ’s are positive with a1 +a2 + · · ·+ak = 1. Further let Y1, Y2, · · · , Yn be positive random variables
with absolute continuous distribution function G. Let NY (n, s) be the maximum number of them
we can sum up without exceeding s. If a value τ is the solution of equation (9), i.e. s = n
´ τ
0
xdG(x)
then
E(NY (n, s)) ≤ n
k∑
j=1
ajFj(τ)
for both independent mixing and class mixing.
Proof: We first look at independent mixing for n distributions. The absolute continuity of all Fj(t)
implies that G(t), being a convex combination of the Fj(t), is also absolute continuous. Hence,
according to the BR-inequality (10),
E(NY (n, s)) ≤ nG(τ) = n
k∑
j=1
ajFj(τ). (47)
Second, for class mixing, let X1, X2, · · · , Xn be a random sample of variables belonging to one
of 1 ≤ k ≤ n classes Cj , j = 1, · · · , k with respective absolute continuous distribution functions Fj .
Let now aj = #Cj/n and G(x) =
∑k
j=1 ajFj(x). Let X1,n ≤ X2,n ≤ · · · ≤ Xn,n be the joint list of
increasing order statistics and N˜(n, s) be defined as in (7). Then we have
s = n
ˆ τ
0
x dG(x) =⇒ E(N˜(n, s)) ≤
k∑
j=1
#Cj Fj(τ), (48)
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since the values s and τ on the l.h.s. satisfy (13) and
s = n
ˆ τ
0
x dG(x) = n
ˆ τ
0
x d
( k∑
j=1
ajFj(x)
)
=
k∑
j=1
naj
ˆ τ
0
x dFj(x) =
k∑
j=1
#Cj
ˆ τ
0
x dFj(x),
and since, with aj ≥ 0 and
∑k
j=1 aj = 1, G is again a convex combination of absolute continuous
distribution functions.
Remark. If we put k = n and #Cj = 1 for all j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} then this is Steele’s extension.
Since the BR-inequality is a special case of Steele’s extension, Lemma 9 is no more than a corollary
of the latter. However, its interpretation has some benefit. Changing policies by re-defining them
as wf-policies for new mixed distributions will, whatever the mixing, and whatever the interde-
pendence of mixing, even applied over successive generations, this will never affect our bounds as
long as we can trust on F. As pointed out by Steele, the bounds only depend on the marginal
distributions, and this means here very much.
9.6 Controlling for convergence to an equilibrium
Certain possibilities of control are easy to understand. If we look at the parameters mh,mi, rh, ri, ..,
and the important roles they play in our equations, they are prominent candidates for control to
reach an equilibrium. However, in reality Society has often not so much influence on them. We
have already mentioned deep-rooted cultural and traditional constraints to change birth rates,
such as in particular mi. For other reasons it may be equally difficult to control rh and ri. There
may be more freedom to change the rate ϕ of integration, but both the home population and
the immigrants have to cope with it, and there are certainly limits. Control must be sufficiently
”smooth”.
Also, if a large ϕ is in principle feasible, what would it mean for the home population if they
become a minority in their country? The evident factors are thus also the evident factors of control,
but, in practice, they may be difficult to control, and it is clearly advisable to try to control several
of them jointly (with smaller changes in mind) than concentrating on one or two only.
What remains in our models are the claim distributions. Their influence is less evident, but
for them Society will have many possible controls ranging from different tax policies over an
uncountable set of possible initiatives up to target-oriented strict legislation. Whatever they might
be, we only would like to discuss how to bring claim distributions into a desired direction. We
want to comment on what guidelines Society may want to follow to do control efficiently, and in
a sufficiently subtle way. This very last discussion is based on no more than a preliminary idea.
Actually the author sees here a whole project of new research.
To make the subject of discussion precise it suffices confine our interest on model Model I. Recall
that the conditions
mhFh(τ) = miFi(τ) ≥ 1 (49)
are necessary for the existence of an equilibrium, where τ and α satisfy the limiting BRS-equality
(15) with the parameters rh, ri,mh,mi and the claim distribution functions Fh and Fi. Suppose
that, for fixed rh, ri,mh,mi there exists b > 0 such that
∀t ≥ b : mhFh(t) ≥ 1 and miFi(t) ≥ 1,
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whereas mhFh(s) 6= miFi(s), for all s ≥ b. Then (49) cannot hold. Consequently, the problem is
now to find an operator T acting on the set of absolute continuous distribution functions such that
mhT ◦ Fh(σ) = miT ◦ Fi(σ) (50)
for some σ > b satisfying the corresponding limiting BRS-equation (15). As we have seen Society
can take measures which will will favour certain claims and discourage other claims and thus change
the pre-supposed distribution function Fh and Fi into de-facto distribution functions F˜h = T ◦ Fh
and F˜i = T ◦ Fi, say, so that claims will be identically distributed according to F˜h in the home-
population and according to F˜i in the immigrant population.
The following suggestion is no more that a preliminary idea:
We recall from measure theory that, given two measurable spaces (S1,Σ1) and (S2,Σ2), say, a
measurable function ψ : S1 → S2, and a measure µ : S1 → R+, the so-called push-forward measure
ψ#µ : S2 → R+ is defined by
∀A ∈ S1 : ψ#µ(A) = µ(ψ−1(A)). (51)
Concerning any question of optimality we recall a result for optimal transformation (transportation)
on the real positive half-line (see e.g. Rachev and Ru¨schendorf (1998)): If the transport cost-
function c(x, y) measuring the cost per unit from x to y is convex in |x − y| then there exists a
unique optimal transport map realising the minimum, cmin say, namely
F−1ν ◦ Fµ : R→ R and cmin =
ˆ 1
0
c(F−1ν (t),F
−1
µ (t)) dt. (52)
Convexity in |x − y| is a reasonable assumption, since costs (in our problem the cost of changing
probability mass from x to y) typically increase in a super-linear way. For instance, we may choose
c(x, y) = |x− y|β for some β > 1.
Now, to enable the existence of an equilibrium, we need not transform one distribution function,
Fh say, into some other specific distribution function F˜h, but, as seen in (49), we want to see them
intersecting if weighted with mh and mi. Let us call this the ”target.”
The target need not be reached in one step. It can, at least in principle, be planned in an
iterative way. In a first step, we may apply class mixing and independent mixing to one side,
mhFh say, and check what this operation T1 does this to the other side. If the target is not
reached, look which of the two resulting functions
mhT1 ◦ Fh , miT1 ◦ Fi
would be more sensitive to control and mixing. We apply then this mixing to obtain two new sides
mhT2 ◦ T1 ◦ Fh and miT2 ◦ T1 ◦ Fi, and so on. Few iteration steps, (k, say) should do, and so, if
methods of optimal transport can be applied stepwise, the hope is that
T := Tk ◦ Tk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ T1
would be a close-to-optimal pursuit of the target.
10 Critical comments and conclusions
10.1 Critical comments
1. Whatever their political or ideologic attitudes, most people agree that the hypotheses H1 and H2
are natural for human populations. However, H1, (populations want to survive forever), is based
on a terminal event. Hence, provided that extinction is avoided in the next n, say generations, the
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realisation of the terminal event depends only on Society’s behaviour at times n + 1, n + 1, · · · .
One only requires P (survival) > 0, and no more. If the society obligation principle is ignored for a
few generations, nothing essential may change. Does this mean that H1 should be better replaced
by a more restrictive hypothesis?
The author’s perception is as follows: Yes, with hypothesis H1, as it stands, a limited number of
exceptions to the society’s obligation rule need not make an important difference. The probability
of survival will change, but it is true that the model is under-determined since only P (survival) > 0
is required. However, we propose to leave the hypothesis H1 as is because any more restrictive form
having a true impact is likely to become too restrictive. This lies in the nature of the hypothesis.
If parents insist that their children have a future, would they care less for their grand-children,
or grand-grand-children ...? If not, then, by recurrence, a Society which does not respect its
obligation principle in each generation, does not respect H1. But then, what else could replace H1
as a generally accepted goal?
2. Is the notion of a global model as a sequence of unknown RDBPs not nebulous, or even redun-
dant? Where is it used?
No, it is neither nebulous nor redundant. RDBPs are well-defined, and so is the society’s obligation
principle. If Society examines in a generation the current RDBP and defines the next RDBP
according to the principle (with all the freedom it has in doing so) then the current RDBP will
have a successor. Thus we have a model, and recursively, a global model. Not knowing the
specifications of the future RDBPs beforehand implies that we have no probability model. This
comes with our intention to keep the model realistic but does not impair the character of being a
model. We use the global model in Def. 6.2, Def. 7.1 and Def 8.2. which make no sense in local
models.
3. Where is the hypothesis H2 (standard of living) actually used?
It is true that H2 never enters our mathematical analysis. However, it intervenes in the freedom
of choice of a policy in any generation. Bruss and Duerinckx (2015) (see Prop. 4.3, p. 346 and
sect.7, pp 364-65) showed that the largest probability for survival and smallest expected standard
of living (capacity to consume) per individual is obtained by the wf-policy. We cannot predict
how much Society would value, in any generation, a higher standard of living (by changing to
another policy) on the expense of the survival probability. However, under the classical hypothesis
of scarce resources, there is an upper bound for an affordable standard of living under a given
survival probability.
4. It is not realistic to suppose that the effectives of a human population can go to infinity.
Therefore, what is the interest of criteria for the existence of equilibria conditioned on survival,
i.e. conditioned on effectives tending to infinity?
The answer (linked with the one given in 3.) is that the asymptotical equilibrium is an idealisation
showing us the way to understand necessary control in the view of H1 and H2 . The hypothesis
H2 implies, as seen in Bruss and Duerinckx (2015), that Society will have the preference to keep
the effective reproduction rate close to the critical value 1. Succeeding in doing so for a long time
is what is really intended; unlimited growth is no convincing target for humanity.
10.2 Conclusions
Immigration leads to a large complex of different questions. Allowing for immigration is, on
one side, an act of altruism, a grandeur of humanism. On the other side, however, allowing for
immigration may equally well be driven by lower motives, ranging in the worst case down to the
intention to exploit a weaker sub-population. The present article does not try to evaluate and
compare advantages and disadvantages of immigration but only to study the question ”When
can it work out in the long run?” The philosophy behind working out is that the inviting home-
population may want to to keep essential parts of its national identity, and the immigrants may
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want to import and live their own culture as far as these are not incompatible. This means in
particular, none should wipe out the other one. A long-term equilibrium between the respective
effectives is seen as a necessary condition to make this possible, and here it is Mathematics rather
than Economics which must deliver answers.
Although the mathematical arguments in this paper are rather elementary, tailoring our models
in such a way that we can apply mathematics, and such that the models do not become unrealistic,
this was more demanding. As pointed out, Steele’s extension had much influence on our approach.
We have not discussed in detail the numerical computation of solutions, but, with the crucial
functions Fδ(τ) and Φδ(τ), δ ∈ {h, i, ni} all being increasing in τ , we had no difficulties in com-
puting the solutions, as checked in several examples. Moreover, our results seem interesting. The
mentioned sensitivity of the solutions as a function of the parameters is sometimes truly surprising,
and it is good to have now explicit equilibrium criteria to see the exact reasons why.
As far as the author is aware, the presented approach to understand the mathematics of immi-
gration and integration is new, and nothing comparable to the obtained explicit results has been
known before.
10.3 Outlook
It would be convincing to see our approach attract the attention of specialists in optimal con-
trol/transport, and the interest of economists. We have provided the theory by taking care to
justify all hypotheses. We have also tried our very best with respect to the transparency of the
models and of the results they yield. However, for reaching the goals in the real life of immigra-
tion, ”smoothness” of actions must be expected to be equally important, and for this part our
Subsection 9.6 may give no more than a modest beginning.
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